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INTRODUCTION

There is no dearth of commentary about the doctrine of equivalents in patent law. 1 Many articles proclaim the doctrine's death,
often noting its passage with unbridled delight. 2 Some articles provide empirical evidence to support the assertion that the doctrine of
equivalents is dead. 3 Others simply yearn for the doctrine to fade

1 For just a few of the many possible examples, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law's Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2009); Michael J.
Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement, and Patent Claim Scope: A New
Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947 (2005); Nicholas Pumfrey et
a!., I1w Doctrine of Equivalents in Various Patent Regimes- Does Anybody Have it Right?,
11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 261 (2008); Harold C. Wegner et a!., The Future of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 277 (1998).
2 See, e.g., Charles W. Adams, TIJe Doctrine of Equivalents: Becoming a Derelict on the
Waters of Patent Law, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (2006); John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, I1w (Unnoticed) Demise of tlze Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 958
(2007); Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of t/ze Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1371,1404 (2010).
The doctrine's demise has also been heralded by non-academic law media. See,
e.g., Eugene R. Quinn, A Slow Death? Killing the Doctrine of Equivalents, 164 PAT.
WORLD 50, 50 (2004), available at http:/ /ipwatchdog.com/articles/ Aug-04Closing.pdf; Victoria Slind-Flor, Doctrine of Equivalents Receives Death Blow in Federal
Circuit, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 14, 2000, at 5 (noting that "the doctrine of equivalents is now
either dead or terminally ill").
3 See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 2.
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from use, pointing out that no court has "articulated a convincing
rationale" for the doctrine's continued use. 4 But maybe these scholars have it wrong. It may be true that the instances of doctrine of
equivalents analysis in patent cases are on the decline and successful outcomes based on the doctrine waning further. But these observations tell only a small part of the story. This Article contends
that, despite evidence to the contrary, the death of the doctrine of
equivalents has been greatly exaggerated. 5
The birth of the doctrine of equivalents was noble enough; it
was created to soften the blow associated with literal interpretation
of patent claim terms. During patent litigation, claims of the patent
are generally construed as lists of necessary and sufficient features
or conditions. During infringement analysis, if each and every
claimed feature or condition is found in the accused device or
process, infringement is found. Infringement, then, can be viewed
like traditional set theory, where an object is deemed a member of a
class if it meets the required attributes of the class. 6 The discontent
with this system comes when the accused device or process does
not squarely satisfy each of the features or conditions of the claim,
yet is essentially the same as the patented invention. Courts have

4 See Adams, supra note 2, at 1116; Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of
Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.l157 (2004).
At least one commentator, however, rues the demise of the doctrine of equivalents. See John F. Duffy, George Wash. Univ. Law School, Thirteenth Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in Intellectual Property Law: Innovation
and Recovery (Oct. 21, 2009), in 14 MARQ. lNTELL. PROP. L. REV. 237, 256 (2010) ("The
demise of the doctrine of equivalents is a shame .... ").
s With apologies to Mark Twain, who remarked, "The report of my death was an
exaggeration." MARK TWAIN: THE COMPLETE INTERVIEWS 317 (Gary Scharnhorst ed.,
2006).
6 See, e.g., ChangingMinds.org, Set Theory,
http:// changingminds.org/ disciplines/ argument/ syllogisms/ set_ theory .htrn (last
visited March 31, 2011) ("In set theory, we say A is a member of B.... This means
that A has all the attributes of B, that A is a B in all respects.").
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been loath to excuse infringers who take the essence, if not the exact
parameters, of the patented invention, whether intentionally or
not. 7 The doctrine of equivalents was thus crafted to permit a finding of infringement, even where the accused device or process does
not literally infringe the claim and to prevent an infringer from
avoiding liability by making trivial changes. 8
The aspirations of the doctrine, however, reach farther. Effective application of the doctrine eases the difficulty of describing and
defining the boundaries of new inventions using words. 9 The doctrine moderates the differences between what the inventor invented, what the patent claims, and what of the invention could
reasonably be described in the words of the claim. 10 But if the doctrine of equivalents is dead, as many contend, where does that leave
us?

7 Patent infringement lies whether the alleged infringer has copied the device or
process from the patent directly, independently invents the device or process, or
knowing of the patent, attempts to make his invention different enough from the
patented invention to escape liability. Although one of the justifications for the doctrine of equivalents is to prevent "unscrupulous copyists," the allegation of outright
copying is rare. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Frontiers in Empirical
Patent Law Scholarship: Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1423-24 (2009).
8 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997); Festa Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002).
9 "Th[e] conversion of machine to words allows for unintended gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to
describe it. The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot.
Things are not made for the sake of words, but words for things."
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. U.S., 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967). See Festa, 535 U.S. at
731 ("Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent application.").
1o See Kenneth D. Bassinger, Allocating Linguistic Uncertainty in Patent Claims: The
Proper Role of Prosecution History Estoppel, 49 LOY. L. REV. 339, 340 (2003) ("The subtle
nuances of inventive genius are not readily described by the often strict confines
imposed by language."); Festa, 535 U.S. at 733 ("The doctrine of equivalents allows
the patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the original patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes.").
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Although language and its usage expand every day to allow for
discussions of new ideas and technology, it still remains difficult, if
not impossible, to describe any new invention in words. In short,
the problems that gave rise to the doctrine are as present today as
ever. If the problem remains, then perhaps the erstwhile solution
provided by the doctrine of equivalents is also still vibrant. Despite
the arguments and evidence that the doctrine is dead, the truth is
more likely that the work previously done by the doctrine is now
being performed at a different stage of the infringement analysis,
and for good reason. Rather than requiring a specialized (and much
derided) doctrine to soften the blow of literally interpreting language, this activity is more naturally performed at the time of construction and infringement determination. In fact, as humans, this is
our intuition.
Cognitive linguistics is the study of how humans naturally
think about and understand language. Some of this understanding
comes from the mental creation of categories, organized around
what is thought to be the "best" example of the category, i.e., the
prototype. 11 When new objects or experiences are encountered, they
are not placed into mental categories based on a list of necessary
and sufficient conditions, as is done in traditional set theory. Rather,
cognitive linguistics has been described as a type of fuzzy set
theory. When encountering something new, the natural tendency is
to categorize the new object or experience based on the extent to
which it resembles the prototype of the category in question versus
the extent to which it resembles other prototypes and categories.
The new object or experience may be categorized even if it lacks one
or more of the characteristics of the prototype. An object or experience can be a "good" member of the category if it closely resem-

11
See
Laura
A.
Janda,
http:// ssrn.corn/ abstract=1408069.

Cognitive

Linguistics

13-15
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bles the prototype, but a "lesser" member of the category if the resemblance is not so much. Thus cognitive linguistics allows for a
kind of fuzzy definition of categories and members.
For a simple example, consider the category bird. 12 One way to
define bird would be to develop a list of features that a bird must
have, such as wings, feathers, and the ability to fly. 13 Many common birds, such as robins, wrens, sparrows, and cardinals, would
fulfill all these criteria and be classified as birds. There are other
animals that are birds that would not meet the given requirements;
penguins do not fly or have regular feathers. Under usual set
theory, the penguin is not a bird because it does not fulfill the necessary and sufficient criteria to be within bird. If instead we define
bird as we do in cognitive linguistics, we may identify a particular
bird, such as a robin, to be the prototype of the category bird. All
other animals would then be compared to the prototypical robin to
determine the extent of resemblance, and thus the level of membership in the category. Wrens, sparrows, and cardinals are easily classified as bird because the level of resemblance to a robin is quite
high. Penguins, however, differ significantly from robins. Yet, in
comparing the penguin to prototypes for other categories, such as
the terrier for dog and the tabby for cat, it becomes clear that the
penguin is most similar to, and thus is considered a member of,
bird.
Returning to patent law- what if instead we interpret claims
and determine infringement as is done in regular speech, using pro-

12 As a matter of convention, a given category will be indicated by bold text to distinguish it from a singular instance of the same.
13 The bird example given in this paragraph is drawn from work done by Eleanor
Rosch, who is considered among the founders of the cognitive linguistics and prototype theory. See, e.g., Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND
CATEGORIZATION 27 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978). See also infra
Section IIA .
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totypes and categories? As an everyday matter, we already know
how to soften the blow of literally interpreting language. By viewing the claim as construed as the prototypical member of the category claim, then an allegedly infringing device or process can be
compared to the construed claim language to determine if it bears
sufficient resemblance to the prototype to be categorized as such. If
so, the accused device or process becomes a reasonably strong
member of claim, and thus infringes. In this light, the decline in the
application in the doctrine of equivalents may simply signal that the
old, set theory-based infringement analysis has given way to the
prototype categorization method. To wit-the doctrine of equivalents is not truly dead, because a penguin is still a bird.
This Article, in Part I, describes the life and alleged death of the
doctrine of equivalents, including where the doctrine of equivalents
comes from and why so many commentators presume or pray for it
to be moribund. Part II explicates in more detail the notions from
cognitive linguistics discussed above, specifically categories, prototypes, and members. Part III of this Article connects these two disparate discussions and explains why cognitive linguistics demonstrates that the underlying notions behind the doctrine of equivalents are present in everyday human understanding of language.
Regardless of when and where it is done, how people understand
and think about language can simply not be divorced from patent
law. This Article concludes that the heart and soul of the doctrine of
equivalents is still very much alive.
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I. THE FUZZY LIFE OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

[T]he doctrine of equivalents ... relieve[s] an inventor from a semantic strait jacket when equity requires .. .
--Chief Judge Howard Markey, Federal Circuit 14
A patent infringement lawsuit generally involves construing
the asserted claims of a patent and comparing the claims as construed to an allegedly infringing device or process. 15 Ideally, claims
are construed early in patent litigation, as the interpretations often
decide, or at least significantly direct the outcome of, the case. 16
During claim construction, each party typically offers its own definitions; the plaintiff proffers an interpretation of disputed terms
that will result in a likely finding of infringement, the defendant
submits definitions that will prohibit a finding of infringement and
may also affect the invalidity of the patent. The judge then defines
the terms, giving boundaries to the scope of the patent claims; basically, the judge constructs a fence around the patentee's exclusive
territory. 17
The jury, or judge in a bench trial, then determines whether the
alleged infringing device or process fits within the bounds of the

14 Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532-33 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
15 An additional step of analyzing any defenses asserted, such as invalidity or inequitable conduct, may also occur. While outside the scope of this paper, this step too
revolves around the understanding of patent claims. See, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Corp. v.
United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
16 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en bane) (Mayer,)., concurring) ("[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly
always to decide the case."), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
17 See Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and tlze Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J.
759, 759 (1999) ("Patent law is about building fences."). But see Dan L. Burk & Mark
A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1743, 1799 (2009) (concluding that patent law would benefit from thinking of
claim construction in terms of sign posts rather than fence posts).
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claims as construed. 18 Literal infringement is found if every element
or limitation of the construed claim is present in the accused device
or process- in other words, the necessary and sufficient conditions
are met or the accused device or process falls within the defined
fence. 19 Where the accused device or process does not fall squarely
within the boundaries of the asserted claim as construed, liability
for infringement may still be found under the doctrine of equivalents. 20 The doctrine essentially creates, outside of the fence, a relatively narrow fuzzy area in which the alleged infringer may still be
held liable. The doctrine's main justification is fairness-patent protection would be "hollow and useless" if a competitor can avoid an
infringement finding by including a trivial difference that would
move the infringer from within to just without the fence constructed by the judge. 21
But in creating this fuzzy area outside the border of the patent
claims, however beneficial to the patentee, the doctrine defeats, or
at least diminishes, the public notice function performed by patent
claims. 22 Patent claims should provide information about what subject matter is open for public use and experimentation, as well as
what is not available for use without infringement. 23 Given the individual importance of each of these two competing interestsfairly maintaining patent value versus fulfilling the public notice

See, e.g., Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997).
2o See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727
(2002) ("(A] patent protects its holder against efforts of copyists to evade liability for
infringement by making only insubstantial changes to a patented invention.").
21 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,607 (1950).
22 See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29.
23 See, e.g., Athletic Alternatives v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Burk & Lemley, supra note 17, at 1791 ("The ostensible purpose of [patent claims
include] placing the public on notice as to the limits of the patent, warning the public
away from the claimed technology, and demarcating the boundary between infringing and non-infringing activity.").
1s

19

Imaged with Permission ofN.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

322

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 6:313

function- it is not surprising that the doctrine of equivalents has
lived a much storied life. The doctrine has received extensive treatment by the Supreme Court, spanning over a century and a half,
and even more analysis at the hands of the Federal Circuit since its
inception in 1982. 24 A brief look at the Court's treatment of the document demonstrates the difficulties in balancing fairness with notice.
A. IN THE BEGINNING

Early in the United States patent system, patent scope was determined not via claims, but by the patent document as a whole, in
a practice known as central claiming. 25 Particularly, the patentee's
exclusive territory included the embodiments described in the full
description and drawings of the patent. 26 In 1854, the Supreme

24 Supreme Court treatment ranges from 1854 in Winans v. Demead, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 330, 334-36 (1854), to 2002, in Festa, 535 U.S. 722. In the mere 28 years the Federal Circuit has been in existence, it has heard some 577 cases about the doctrine of
equivalents, measured by searching all cases of the Federal Circuit that mention the
doctrine of equivalents at least 5 times. LexisNexis, http:/ jwww.lexisnexis.com (last
visited Apr. 6, 2011) (search performed by searching for "at! 5 (doctrine of equivalents)" after following the "Federal Legal- U.S." hyperlink, then "Find Cases," then
"Federal Courts by Circuit," then "Federal Cases by Circuit," then "Federal CircuitUS Court of Appeals Cases"). The earliest case discovered by the search was SSIH
Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983); the most recent
case is Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 2011
US App. LEXlS 3546 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 24, 2011).
25 See Adams, supra note 2, at 1117; Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 134, 135-37 (1938).
26Hilton Davis Chern. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1565-66 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
"The majority in Winans endorsed central claiming, subordinating the
claim to the fuller description and the drawings of the invention contained
in other parts of the patent .... It continued to be left to the courts to sift
through the entirety of the patent description to determine what were the
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Court recognized a significant limitation of the central claiming system, namely that the patent's scope was constrained to only the
embodiments depicted. But to limit the scope to only the embodiments described was unfair; to expect the patentee to illustrate
every possible modification and option was impractical. 27 The Supreme Court addressed this shortfall in the case of Winans v. Demead. 28 In this case, the patent taught a train car with a circular bottom to better distribute the weight of the load; the alleged infringer
made similar train cars that were octagonal rather than circular. 29
The Court reversed the trial court's holding of no infringement, remanding the case to determine if the octagonal shape was "so near
to a true circle as substantially to embody the patentee's mode of
operation, and thereby attain the same kind of result as was reached
by his invention." 30
Central claiming gave way to peripheral claiming in the Patent
Act of 1870. 31 This made mandatory the inclusion of claims at the
end of the patent document and set forth the claims as the boundary of the exclusive territory granted by the patent. 32 In many respects the peripheral claiming system was a positive change. First,
the patentee was able to more clearly delineate the metes and
bounds of his invention, rather than having to rest on what the

material elements embodying the 'principle' or 'essence' of the invention ..
"
27 Winans, 56 U.S. at 343-44.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 331-32.
30 See id. at 344.
31 See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1566 ("The amendment of the patent statute by the
Act of 1870, while a small language change, was interpreted to effect a major change
from central to peripheral claiming, or at least a modified form of peripheral claiming.").
32 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.").
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court believed to be inventive. 33 Second, the patentee could realistically provide a number of potential embodiments without creating
an unwieldy patent document, as would have been required under
the central claiming system. Specifically, rather than having to fully
describe each potential embodiment that the inventor wished to
cover in the patent specification, he could more broadly describe a
"preferred" embodiment and then use multiple claims to signal variations on that preferred embodiment. 34 Both of these changes
should have diminished the need for the doctrine of equivalents.
Nearly a century passed before the Supreme Court next spoke
on the doctrine of equivalents. In 1950, the Court affirmed the viability of the doctrine in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co. Again, focusing on fairness, the Court reasoned that the
doctrine was necessary to prevent competitors from making insignificant changes to a patented invention without liability, thereby devaluing the patent. 35 After the Court affirmed the doctrine of equi-

See Adams, supra note 2, at 1119.
Robert H. Resis, Reducing the Need for Markman Determinations, 4 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 53, 55 (2004).
"The Federal Circuit also has held that the claims are not limited to the
preferred embodiment(s) disclosed in the detailed description. To avoid
being limited to what they specifically disclose, patent applicants can
simply draft dependent claims that are broader than their preferred embodiment(s). Regardless, patent applicants are presumably not limited to the
preferred embodiment(s)."
However, the claims cannot extend well beyond the scope of the written description.
See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("[T]he scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of
enablement provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.");
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854) ("[H]e claims an exclusive right to
use a manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not invented,
and therefore could not describe when he obtained his patent. The court is of the
opinion that the claim is too broad, and not warranted by law.").
35 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950).
The flip side of protecting the patentee, as noted in dissent, is that the use of the doc33

34
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valents in Graver Tank, it seemed as though the doctrine would flourish-and it did. Not until some forty-seven years after Graver Tank
did the Supreme Court take up the doctrine of equivalents yet
again, this time to rein it in just a bit. In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of equivalents, but balanced the doctrine with what is now known as "all
elements rule." 36 This limitation on the doctrine was added to salvage some sort of public notice of the scope of patent protection.
The Supreme Court also discussed the rule of prosecution history
estoppel, a previously-recognized limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents that also addressed public notice. 37
Even after Warner-Jenkinson, the doctrine of equivalents would
have seemed to have a fairly robust life. The Federal Circuit, however, found the all-elements and the prosecution history estoppel
rules difficult to apply; to make things easier, the court imposed an
absolute bar in cases of prosecution history estoppel. 38 If a claim

trine of equivalents imposes the great cost of uncertainty of claim scope. See id. at 617
(Black, J., dissenting).
36 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997). The
"all elements" rule requires that the doctrine of equivalents is to be performed on an
element-by-element basis. See id.
37 See id. at 30. See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966) (noting that
"claims that have been narrowed [during prosecution] in order to obtain the issuance
of a patent by distinguishing the prior art cannot be sustained to cover that which
was previously by limitation eliminated from the patent."). Prosecution history estoppel is also called file wrapper estoppel in earlier cases. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520
U.S. at 30.
38 It is not too surprising that the Federal Circuit went in this direction postWarner-Jenkinson. In the case's first trip to the Federal Circuit from the trial court, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding of infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 152829 (1995). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Federal Circuit's opinion, and remanded the case in light of its new decision. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997). On remand, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the infringement finding with respect to one of the two patents at issue, but
remanded for the trial court to determine prosecution history estoppel with respect
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was subject to a narrowing amendment during prosecution, the
doctrine of equivalents was wholly unavailable to the patentee. Instead, the patent would be limited to its literal scope, improving
public notice. And this bright line rule signaled what many assumed was the doctrine's death march.
B.

AND THEN THE "END"

In 2002, the Supreme Court weighed in on the doctrine of equivalents, and particularly the Federal Circuit's bright line rule, in the
case of Festa Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. 39 The
Court held that the complete bar imposed by the Federal Circuit
was inconsistent with both the rationale for the doctrine (the ability
to avoid infringement by making a trivial modification) as well as
the reason for the prosecution history estoppel limitation (preserving public notice). 40
The Festa Court hinged its opinion on the difficulties of language- namely the inability to perfectly describe an invention in
words; the doctrine prevents the patentee from being unfairly limited by his words. 41 However, the test ultimately set forth in the

to the second patent. Hilton Davis Chern. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d
1161, 1162-63 (1997).
39 Festa Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
40 Id. at 737-38.
41 /d. at 738.
"It does not follow, however, that the amended claim becomes so perfect
in its description that no one could devise an equivalent. After amendment, as before, language remains an imperfect fit for invention. The narrowing amendment may demonstrate what the claim is not; but it may still
fail to capture precisely what is."
See Adams, supra note 2, at 1151-52 (noting that the exceptions to prosecution history estoppel are based on whether at the time of amendment one skilled in the art
could reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent).
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case has little to do with language or preserving patent value. Festo
provides a list of three circumstances that would permit a patentee
to seek infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, even if a
narrowing amendment had been made to that claim: 42 that the
equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of amendment, that the
reason for amendment bears only tangential relation to the equivalent in question, or that there may be some other reason, such as the
limitations of language, that the patentee could not reasonably be
expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question. 43 The one rebuttal that may actually be related to the problem
being solved-the inadequacy of language-is the one that is most
circumspect. 44 In any case, all three circumstances are to be interpreted narrowly. 45 In the end, it seems that public notice prevailed
over fairness.
Although many scholars point to Festo as sounding the doctrine
of equivalents' purported death knell, others argue that the doctrine
of equivalents died when the Markman opinion was issued in 1996.
In Markman, the Supreme Court took the task of claim construction
from the jury and rested interpretation power solely with the
judge. 46 Theoretically, the doctrine of equivalents and the bases for
Markman are at odds. The purpose of Markman was to improve
claim construction, because uniform claim constructions and cer-

See Festa, 535 U.S. at 740-41.
Id. at 740-41.
44 The Federal Circuit did note on remand that "the third criterion may be satisfied when
there was some reason, such as the shortcomings of language, why the patentee was prevented from describing the alleged equivalent when it narrowed the claim." Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en
bane).
45 See id. (noting that "some other reason" must be construed narrowly); id. at 1377
(Rader, J., concurring) (limiting the foreseeability criterion to after-arising technologies); Cross Med. Prods. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 480 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (reaffirming that the tangential rebuttal must be applied narrowly).
46 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996).
42
43

Imaged with Permission ofN.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

328

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 6:313

tainty of claim scope would better serve the public notice function. 47 The doctrine of equivalents, on the other hand, realizes that
uniform claim constructions may result in unfairness and purposefully makes the claim scope inconsistent or fuzzy. 48
In addition to theoretical tension, there is a procedural basis for
blaming Markman for the decline of the doctrine of equivalents. Before Markman, patent infringement cases proceeded generally in one
step, as a jury would construe the claims as part of the overall infringement determination. After Markman, patent infringement cases were split into two prongs, the judge's claim construction and the
jury's determination of infringement based on the claims as construed. Often, the claim construction rendered by the judge proves
to be dispositive on the question of literal infringement. 49 Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents still lingers, however, as the
question of whether an element in the accused device or process is
equivalent to the claimed element is a question of fact. Therefore,
the judge has incentive to find non-infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents on summary judgment to get the patent case off his
docket. 50 Parties generally welcome this, because an opinion that
addresses both literal infringement and infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents is ripe for appeal to the Federal Circuit. The
decline in successful doctrine of equivalents cases may very well be

47

See id. at 390.
John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: Tile DOE in tile Post-Markman Era, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 155-56 (2005).
49 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
bane) (Mayer, J., concurring) ("[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly always to
decide the case."), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); id. at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Deciding the meaning of the words used in the patent is often dispositive of the question of infringement.").
50 See Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 977; Petherbridge, supra note 2, at 1377.
48
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a sign of a general judicial desire to avoid lengthy and complex patent trials. 51
From this discussion, it is easy to see why the many commentators assume the doctrine of equivalents is dying, if not already
dead. Certainly the doctrine's appearance and its successful use
seem to be on the downturn. However, a bit of life lurks beneath the
surface. This is where the idea of cognitive linguistics proves insightful.

II. COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS

- THE

Fuzzy EDGES OF WORDS

Language is the source of misunderstandings.
- Antoine de Saint-Exupery 52
Linguistics is simply the study of language.s3 Traditional linguistics begins with the pieces of language and examines how they
are put together for communication. For example, sounds (phonemes) are joined to make words that serve as basic building blocks
(morphemes), to which we can add prefixes and suffixes to create
additional words. 54 All of these words have meanings (semantics).ss
The words are combined based on a grammar, or set of rules, to
form a sentence or complete idea (syntax).S6 Finally, a group of

51 See Peter J. Ayers, Armed and Ready: Defeating Patent Infringement Claims by
Summary Judgment, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 421, 448 (1999) (noting that

filing for summary judgment on infringement issues after claim construction will
result in avoiding an entire trial, at best, or having the case remanded for trial, at
worst).
52 See ANTOINE DE 5AINT-EXUPERY, THE LITTLE PRINCE 60 (Richard Howard trans.,
South China Printing 2000) (1943).
53 See Peter M. Tiersma, The Judge as Linguist, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 269,269 (1993).
54 See, e.g., Jiri Janko, Note, Linguistically Integrated Contractual Interpretation: Incorporating Semiotic Theory of Meaning-Making into Legal Interpretation, 38 RUTGERS L.J.
601,613-17 (2007).
55

56

See id.
See id.
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ideas or sentences, when considered in context, can acquire additional meaning (pragmatics). 57
Cognitive linguistics takes a different approach, starting with a
conversation as a whole and breaking it down based on the function and use of language. Rather than viewing language as a combination of little bits of sounds and words, as is the case in traditional linguistics, cognitive linguistics view language as a reflection
of the human mind.ss In this way, understanding language can tell
us interesting things about how human beings see and comprehend
the world.
For the purposes of this paper, and perhaps for understanding
language in any case, the focus must be the set of words that humans use to perceive, appreciate, and discuss their world.59 Knowledge of language, or more precisely the creation of vocabulary,
comes generally from use. Consider how children acquire their first
language. The initial words learned are those used for labelingthat is, mapping a word to a concept, such as dog or mama. But the
child then learns that all animals are not dogs and all caregivers or
women are not mama. The child then has to learn how far to extend
the labeled concept and by what measure things fit within or without the concept. 60 Language acquisition thus extends from labeling
to categorization, a key feature of cognitive linguistics. 61

See id.
See, e.g., Carl 5. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants,
Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 355 (1999).
59 See, e.g., DAVID A. WILKINS, LINGUISTICS IN LANGUAGE TEACHING 111 (Hodder
Arnold 1974) (1972) ("[W]ithout grammar very little can be conveyed, without vocabulary nothing can be conveyed.") (emphasis omitted).
60 Yanqing Chen, A Cognitive Linguistic Approach to Classroom Englis/1 Vocabulary
Instruction for EFL Learners in Mainland China, 2 ENG. LANGUAGE TEACHING 95, 95
(2009) ("[C]ognitive linguistics is an approach that is 'based on our experience in the
world and the way we perceive and conceptualize it,' an approach to the analysis of
natural language that focuses on language as an instrument for organizing,
57

58
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PROTOTYPE SEMANTICS

When encountering a word or situation for the first time, it is
natural for us to determine how the new word or situation relates to
words and situations we have encountered before. Perhaps it fits
within one or more existing categories created from other encounters; perhaps it calls for the definition of the new category, distinguished from the existing categories. In short, meaning comes from
experiences, experiences are stored in categories, and future experiences will be stored via inclusion in and relationships to existing
categories.62 Categorization approximates how we, as humans, experience the world and how we conceptualize and process our experiences.
Traditionally, categorization calls to mind set theory. Each category is a set, and the set is defined by a list of necessary and sufficient conditions. 63 An object that satisfies the list of conditions is a
member of the set, or category. 64 An object that does not satisfy the
entire list is not. Whether an object satisfies any one criterion is a
binary question, as is membership in the set.65 But this does not
align with how we intuitively think about language. Human beings
do not encounter new experiences armed with a list of conjunctive
criteria to be established. 66 Further, objects we encounter in the

processing, and conveying information . . . .") (citation omitted), available at
http://www .ccsenet.org/ journal/ index. php/ elt/ article/ view /343/306. See also
Janda, supra note 11, at 16 ("The urge to categorize is very strong, and it seems that in
order to process, store, manipulate, and access information, human beings need to
organize it in categories.").
61 See Chen, supra note 60, at 96.
62 See, e.g., WILLIAM CROFf & D. ALAN CRUSE, COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 74 (2004).
63 Tom Cunningham, Categories versus Rules, 4 (1998) (unpublished student
project), http:// meansandends.com/TomCunningham/ files/ categorisation. pdf.
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK}OHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 71 (1980).
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world rarely meet binary criteria or fit perfectly within one category. 67 It is this realization that gave rise to the idea of prototype semantics.
The idea that language is not defined by a set of strictly defined
categories (as is the case in set theory) developed from the work of
philosophers, linguists, and psychologists beginning in the mid-2Qth
century. Wittgenstein noticed that, while classical category theory
required clear boundaries based on common properties and binary
membership, reality calls for fuzzy boundaries. 68 Rather than a list
of necessary and sufficient conditions, categories are defined by
family resemblances, with membership in the category being a matter of degree. 69 Others observed that words can become members of
a category based on relationships to other words in the category,
even in the absence of family resemblance.7° Labov demonstrated
that, even if a set of subjects initially identified an object as belonging to one category, a slight change in the object may result in any
number of categories being identified by the same subjects. 71
The true breakthrough in prototype semantics is generally attributed to Eleanor Rosch, who greatly influenced cognitive linguistics by developing the theory of prototypes and categorization. 72
She showed that the subconscious human mind organizes all expe-

67
68

See id.
See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES

REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 16-17 (1987).
69

7o

See id.
See id. at 18-20.

71 For example, all subjects uniformly identified a curved object having a handle
and a certain height/width ratio as a "cup." However, when the ratio was altered
slightly, the subjects returned a number of identifications, such as "cup," "mug," and
"bowl." See Cunningham, supra note 63, at 5; William Labov, The Boundaries of Words
and their Meanings, in Fuzzy GRAMMAR: A READER 67, 76-85 (Bas Aarts et al. eds.,
2004).
n See Lakoff, supra note 68, at 39.
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riences into categories. 73 Within these categories are hierarchies and
between categories are relationships. 74 Each category has a prototypical member, a "best" representation of the category or a member "par excellence." 75 Other members of the category are peripheral members. 76 All peripheral members bear some relationship to the
prototypical member, but they may have varying degrees of similarity, or unequal status, as members. 77
The bird example discussed in the Introduction represents one
of Rosch's best known studies. In a survey of university students,
she first explained how members of a category could be better
members or worse members of a category. 78 She then asked the
students to rate over 50 members of a category on a scale of 1 to 7,
based on how good a representative they considered the particular
member to be for the given category. 79 In one study, the category
was bird and she defined the category based on thirteen attributes
that are common to birds: eggs, beak, wings, fly, cage, feathers, colors, etc. 80 A robin shared the most attributes of these thirteen than
did other members of bird and thus became the prototypical bird. 81
Based on the students' responses, there was a big discrepancy between sparrows (very much like bird) and penguins (very unlike
bird)-even though the list of 50-plus members contained only
birds.82

See id.
See Janda, supra note 11, at 13-18.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See Cunningham, supra note 63, at 6-7; Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Representations
of Semantic Categories, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PsYCH.: GEN. 192,192-223 (1975).
79 See Rosch, supra note 78, at 192-223.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See id.
73

74
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Recent linguistics research has further developed the field of
prototype semantics. One example is the introduction of fuzziness.
Linguists have determined that the boundaries between categories
are fuzzy, or non-binary, as are the boundaries of criteria ascribed
to any given category. 83 The degree of membership in any category
is also fuzzy. x4 Additionally, the criteria associated with categories
are not simply definitional, but instead represent high-level abstract
conceptualization as well as important cultural beliefs. 85
Fuzzy logic is a mathematical manifestation of the same idea. In
fuzzy logic, binary results represent the end of a continuum and
most observations fall somewhere along the scale. x6 The field of
fuzzy logic is much more developed and complex than this, but the
message is the same-the observable world does not work in absolutes, but in varying degrees. 87 Although true as well in prototype
semantics, the idea of weighted criteria may be easier to understand
in terms of mathematical fuzzy logic. In addition to permitting satisfaction of membership criteria to various degrees, fuzzy logic also
permits criteria of different importance. 88 For example, the criterion
that a member of bird has feathers may be more important than the
criterion of the ability to fly. Thus, a bird that has feathers and flies
would be a good member of bird. All other criterion being equal, a
bird that has feathers, but does not fly, may still be a reasonably
strong member of bird. However, a bird that does not have feathers, but does fly, would be a much lesser member of bird, even

83 See Cunningham, supra
note 63, at 9; JOHN R. TAYLOR, LiNGUISTIC
CATEGORIZATION: PROTOTYPES IN LiNGUISTIC THEORY 38 (2d ed. 1995).
84 See Taylor, supra note 83, at 51.
8; See id. at 82-83.
86 See, e.g., BART KOSKO, Fuzzy THINKING: THE NEW SCIENCE OF FUZZY LOGIC 18
(1993); DANIEL MCNEILL & PAUL FREIBERGER, FUZZY LOGIC 12 (1993).
87 See, e.g., MARTIN GARDNER, WEIRD WATER & Fuzzy LOGIC 158 (1996).
88 See, e.g., R.E. Bellman & L.A. Zadeh, Decision-Making in a Fuzzy Environment, 17
MGMT. Set. B141, Bl49-50 (1970).
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though it too meets the other criteria, because the feather criteria
was deemed more important.
B.

CONNECTIONS, HIERARCHIES, AND TAXONOMIES

One of the benefits of thinking about language in terms of fuzzy
categories is the ability to recognize relationships between various
categories in a way that may not be possible with traditional sets.
One relationship between categories is based on a taxonomic hierarchy. 89 Superordinate categories are more broad, but related, categories; subordinate categories are more specific, but related, categories. 90 The basic level is the one at which category members have
similarly perceived overall shapes. 91 Basic level categories are the
first level understood by children and represent the most commonly used labels. 92 Moreover, it is the basic level at which our knowledge is organized. 93 A word commonly understood by a child
learning to talk is the term dog. Later, the child will learn the superordinate animal, a category to which dog belongs, and subordinates, such as retriever or poodle, which belong, among others, to
the category dog. 94 In another example, if chair is the basic level
word, a superordinate category may be furniture. Other members
of furniture may be table and bed. Similarly, there may be subordinate, peripheral members of chair, such as recliner and stool. The
fuzzy boundaries of the categories allow for more inclusive subordinate and superordinate memberships, resulting in a more complete taxonomy.

89 See, e.g., Croft & Cruse, supra note 62, at 96-97; Cognitive Linguistics,
http:// cogling.wikia.corn/wiki/Levels_of_categorization (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
90 See Croft & Cruse, supra note 62, at 96-97.
91 See id.
92 See Janda, supra note 11, at 16.
93 See id.
94 See Lakoff, supra note 68, at 46.
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There are also connections within categories. This permits
chaining, such that there may be peripheral members that have no
particular feature in common with the prototypical member. 95 The
nearest members to each member in the category have similar features, but the members at the ends of the spectrum may have nothing in common. 96
Another feature of categorization is that these categories are not
pigeon holes, as they are in set theory. Rather, the categories may be
interrelated and objects may be members, to varying extents, of
multiple categories. Consider a fallen log- it can be considered to
have a seat, because it can be sat upon. Having a seat is an important attribute of the category chair. But certainly a log is not a very
good member of chair because it does not include other characteristics of chair, such as a back or 4 legs. A log may be a fairly good
member of nature and a subordinate member of category tree, but
it can also be a poor member of chair at the same time. This concept
also allows for constructing a web of words that would be nearly
opposites in set theory but instead may bear some level of relation,
such as terms like black and white, or fingers and toes, or cops and
robbers.97 Network building serves to link all the labels and categories that exist in our minds and lays the groundwork for a process
that continues for as long as we are exposed to new words (and
new meanings for old words) -that is, for the rest of our lives.9s
Because these concepts and relationships seem a bit elementary,
it may be tempting to deny the value of this aspect of prototype semantics. Consider, however, the differences between acquiring language and later learning a second language. Take a native English

See Janda, supra note 11, at 13.
%See id.
97 See id.
98 See id.

95
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speaker who is learning to speak Spanish. The Spanish words will
not be cemented in the subject's network, as are English words. Instead, the network building involved is most often a mapping of the
second language onto the first, without creating categories or associations between the Spanish words themselves. 99 Rather than
learning dog in relation to external experiences, the subject learns
that perro stands for dog. 100 In contrast, very young children exposed
to parents speaking different languages (e.g., a mother speaks English to the child and a father speaks Spanish), the children learn
both languages at a similar rate and exhibit no preference for either
language. This is because the child is independently creating both
language networks at the same time, rather than mapping a second
language onto a primary network.
C.

CATEGORIZATION IN ACTION

To truly see the benefit of prototype semantics, a more detailed
illustration is helpful. Recall that traditional interpretation is definitional; a word is defined by a set of features or rule-like properties
that are binary, necessary, and sufficient conditions. 101 Under a definitional view, we might determine that a member of set chair includes a seat, four legs, and a back, where the back is connected to
one side of the seat and the four legs are connected to the other side
of the seat. 102 Under traditional definitional interpretation (similar

99 See Lakoff,
100 See id.

supra note 68, at 97.

101 See Andrew Auchincloss Lundgren, Perspectives on Patent Claim Construction:
Re-examining Markman v. Westview Instruments Through Linguistic and Cognitive
Theories of Decisionmaking, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 173, 207-08 (2004); Linda
Coleman & Paul Kay, Prototype Semantics: The English Word Lie, 57 LANGUAGE 26, 2627 (1981).
102 Chair Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http:/ jwww.merriarn-

webster.com/ dictionary/ chair (defining "chair" as "a seat typically having four legs
and a back for one person") (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
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to set theory), if a newly encountered object does not meet all of
these criteria, it is not a chair. But we can think of all sorts of chairs
that cannot be members of category chair as defined. Imagine a
stool (often no back, often having only 3 legs), a fancy Swedish
chair that has a base rather than legs (no legs), or even a bean bag
(no distinct seat, legs, or back). Perhaps you could make the argument that none of these examples are really chairs. And yet, if a
guest to your house asked for a chair, you might reasonably direct
them to any one of these objects, at least in a pinch. Similarly, we
can think of things that do meet the criteria for chair, but that we
would be unlikely to provide when asked for a chair, such as a sofa
(having a seat, four legs, and a back, where the back is connected to
one side of the seat and the legs are connected to the other). Even
more extreme, a bed with a headboard could conceivably meet the
criteria to fit in the category chair. The problem is that membership
in the set chair is binary. Under set theory, there is no possibility of
"almost a chair" for a 3-legged stool or "like a chair but different"
for a sofa. 103
To illustrate how prototype semantics would work differently,
consider a particular construct that has been used for experiments
in this area. First a schema, or a list of properties associated with the
category, is created. 104 In traditional set theory, these properties are
binary or dichotomous; in prototype semantics, the properties may
be binary or may be fuzzy, allowing for multiple levels on which
the property is met. 105 Membership in the category is fuzzy in much

103 A reasonable objection would be to use more or less precision when defining
the conditions that define chair. However, if you make the definition more lax, more
false "positives" will occur; if you tighten up the definition, more false "negatives"
will occur. Even putting those risks aside, it is impractical to draft a list of perfect
conditions for any and every particular human encounter.
1lll See Coleman & Kay, supra note 101, at 27.
105 See id.
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the same way. 106 Rather than a dichotomous category set (member
or not member), category membership in prototype semantics is
represented as a gradient, where the levels satisfaction of properties
goes towards degree of membership, but the properties may carry
different weights. 107 Taken together, the more prototype properties
an object includes (and at a higher level of gradient and/ or carrying
a greater weight), the higher the object will score-that is, the more
or better of a member of the category set forth by the schema. 108
Returning to the category chair, we can use the terms that were
necessary and sufficient under traditional set theory (seat, 4 legs,
back, and the connections between) as the schema. But now, we can
more accurately represent our real-life experiences with various
types of chairs by permitting non-binary satisfaction of criteria. For
instance, the stool would satisfy the seat criteria fully, but would
only meet the 4-legs property to some extent. Taken together, the
criteria satisfied by the 3-legged stool would be less than a given
chair that would fit in the category chair when defined in set
theory, because that chair necessarily would include all of the criteria perfectly. The difference is that under prototype semantics, the
3-legged stool would still likely rise to a gradient level that would
include it in chair, albeit at some lower level of membership. Additionally, it may be more important for a chair to have a back than to
have 4 legs, so that a 3-legged seat with a back would be a better
member of chair than a 3-legged seat without a back, but a 3-legged
seat with a back would be nearly as good a member of chair as a 4legged seat with a back. Similar inferences can be drawn so that the
category chair may include the chairs that were previously excluded in traditional set theory, i.e., the Swedish design chairs (no

See id.
See id.
108 See id.
106
107
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legs, but seat and backs), ergonomic chairs (legs but no back), and
even bean bags (no legs, no backs).
The inclusion of a bean bag in category chair raises the question
of where the line is drawn between a poor member of a category
and an object that is not a member of the category. For example, it is
conceivable that a chair could be built with no seat. This imagined
piece of furniture has 4 legs, a back, and maybe even arms, just no
seat. Would this object be a member of chair? Maybe-if it had sufficient membership qualities to fall within the gradient of chair.
However, it would certainly not be a very good member and may
not have enough in common with the category schema to even be
included in chair. One idea that protects against the absurd result of
including a chair with no seat in the category is that the properties
of the schema that are most tied to the human experience and interaction with the object are given greater weight. 109 Thus, our experiences with chairs would lead us to assign much more value to
having a seat (something to sit on) than to the other criteria. The
seat-less chair would likely fall below the threshold criteria for
membership.
Categories with fuzzy boundaries, defined by non-binary criteria, are helpful to understand how we acquire language and use it
to assimilate and interact with the world around us. The development of prototype semantics provided great insight into how
people think about language. The question, then, is how prototype
semantics might afford the same insight in the patent law world.

109

See Janda, supra note 11, at 16.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
-- Ludwig Wittgenstein 110
It is astonishing is how little patent law draws from the linguistics field, despite the frequent searching by commentators and
courts for alternative approaches. The analogies between patent law
and cognitive linguistics are remarkable. Prototype semantics, and
particularly the aspect of non-binary categorization, are advantageous for looking at the doctrine of equivalents, a doctrine specifically designed to create a fuzzy boundary around the fences created
by claim construction.
This section discusses two main observations and a conclusion.
First, the process of claim construction, or the search for meaning of
claim terms, is inconsistent with how we acquire and understand
language. The results are definitions that are thorny to work with.
Second, these imperfect claim constructions are then used as necessary and sufficient conditions to determine infringement; but when
dealing with language, it is difficult to make determinations based
on definitional, or binary, criteria. The result of these shortcomings
is a flawed infringement analysis. Rather than dealing with this, the
courts created the doctrine of equivalents to compensate.
If the doctrine of equivalents is dead, as has been reported, does
that mean that the problems of language no longer exist in infringement analysis? My conclusion is no; rather, courts have begun
sub silentio to deal with the imperfections in claim construction and
infringement analysis that was previously addressed by the doctrine. Because a more natural way to interpret and apply language
is through fuzzy categorization, it makes sense that the artificial

110
LUDWIG WITIGENSfEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 5.6 (C.K. Ogden
trans., 1922), available at http:/ /www.gutenberg.org/files/5740/5740-pdf.pdf.

Imaged with Permission ofN.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

342

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 6:313

leeway that had been accomplished by the doctrine of equivalents
actually occurs elsewhere-namely in more instinctive claim constructions and infringement comparisons. In other words, the doctrine of equivalents is not truly dead.
A. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION VERSUS Fuzzy CATEGORIZATION

The first step of infringement analysis is always claim construction. 111 Claim construction, or defining the words that delineate the
patentee's exclusive territory, is implicated in the doctrine of equivalents because one of the justifications for the doctrine is the difficulty of capturing inventions in words. 112 I assert that part of this
difficulty is due to the fact that the process of claim construction
clashes with how we generally acquire and understand language. In
part because it is unnatural to think about words in definitional
terms and in part because the claim interpretations will be subsequently used to determine infringement, the process of claim construction should be less about finding definitional meaning and
more about building new connections with existing categories. Two
aspects of current claim construction practice are particularly incompatible: first, claim terms are to be construed in a vacuum, and
second, a judge's personal understanding of claim terms is not relevant. Both of these rules conflict with how language is generally
understood and have lead to claim constructions requiring flexibility at application.
The existing claim construction mantra is as follows. Claims are
to be given their "ordinary and customary meaning" that would be

m See, e.g., Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 804 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
112 See supra Section I.B; Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) ("The language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance
of the invention or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty.").
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given to them by someone of ordinary skill in the relevant art. 113 To
determine the ordinary and customary meaning, the courts look at
intrinsic evidence, including the claim itself, the specification, and
the record of communication between the patentee and the Patent
Office created during patent acquisition, known as the prosecution
history. 114 Courts may also consider extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, treatises, and expert testimony, but this evidence is considered less reliable than the intrinsic evidence. 115
First, because claims are to be construed in light of the intrinsic
evidence, the implication is that the accused device is not to be considered. 116 In any case, the accused device has no bearing on how a
person of skill in the art would interpret the claim terms. 117 The
Federal Circuit has allowed that courts should focus on the aspects
of the accused device that are in dispute, but does not permit the
court to construe claims by making a side-by-side comparison. 118
While this rule helps in preventing the judge from deciding the in-

113 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
bane).
114 See id. at 1314.
m See id. at 1317-19.
116 See, e.g., SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("A claim is construed in the light of the claim language, the other claims, the prior
art, the prosecution history, and the specification, not in light of the accused device.")
(emphasis in original).
117 See Peter S. Menell et a!., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and
Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 816 (2010).
118 See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Brads by Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 132627 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pall Corp. v. Hemasure Inc., 181 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("Although the construction of the claim is independent of the device charged with
infringement, it is convenient for the court to concentrate on those aspects of the
claim whose relation to the accused device is in dispute."); Scripps Clinic & Research
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Of course the particular accused product (or process) is kept in mind, for it is efficient to focus on the
construction of only the disputed elements or limitations of the claims."), overruled by
Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282,1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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fringement case via the claim construction, 119 it causes claim construction look more like learning a second language than understanding a first language.
Recall that language acquisition and understanding comes from
categorization and, perhaps more importantly for understanding,
the creation of relationships or connections between categories. 120
But if we are simply mapping one word to another, such as mapping the Spanish word perro to dog, then the only connection made
is that one word equals another. Defining terms in a patent based
on the words in the specification or the words in a dictionary is very
similar. What is missing are the connections between the basic level
word (or, perhaps in patent law, the claim term at issue) and any
superordinates and subordinates that may elaborate on meaning.
With the foreign language example, simply mapping perro to dog
may eliminate making a connection that a perro is one type of animal
or that a caniche is a particular type of perro. 121 Also missing are
connections between the basic level word and words in the same
category that have a different sense. For example, knowing that the
Spanish word silla means chair does not provide the related connections that a recliner (reclinable) is a fairly good chair but a log (tronco
de madera) is a very poor chair.
To make claim construction more akin to language acquisition
and understanding, a judge would need to interact with the invention and/ or the accused device to permit him to create his own cat-

119 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996). But see
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane)
(Mayer, ]., concurring) ("To decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide
the case."), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
120 See supra Section II.
121 The English word animal translates to the Spanish word animal and the term
poodle translates to caniclze. Animal and Poodle Translaitons, LAROUSSE ONLINE
ENGLISH-SPANISH DICfiONARY, http:// www.larousse.com/ en/ dictionaries/ englishspanish (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (searched for "animal" and "poodle").
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egories and connections. Although abolished over 130 years ago, an
early Patent Act required the inventor to submit a working model
of the invention to the Patent Office as part of the patent acquisition
process. 122 There are significant upsides and downsides to requiring
the patentee to submit a working model, including the fact that not
all patentees reduce their inventions to practice. 123 However, in the
midst of an infringement trial, it is pretty clear that at least the alleged infringer has an actual device or process that the judge could
encounter. This, too, has the downside of potentially affecting the
judge's claim construction in favor or against infringement, but the
advantage would be that the claim construction rendered could
reflect the categorizations and connections that the judge made
based on his encounter with the technology.
Second, meaning is typically tied to the categories and connections that have been made based on past experiences. Even though
the words being considered are public, we necessarily think about
and consider them differently, based on personal previous encounters.124 Judges were given the task of construing patent claims, in
part because of their expertise, 125 including the categories and connections they personally created. This confidence should signal that
judges' past experiences should play a role in claim construction.
However, in the face of frequent criticism and appellate reversal,
judges have expressed anxiety about this supposed competence. 126
Further, the Federal Circuit has impliedly rejected the use of a

Dood, Patent Models and the Patent Law: 1790-1880 (Part I), 65 J.
217 (1983).
123 See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61
HAsTINGS L.J. 65 (2009) (describing the costs and benefits of an early filing system,
which does not require a working model).
124 See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Torben Spaak, Fuzzifying the Natural Law- Legal
Positivist Debate, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 85,95 (1995).
125 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-89 (1996).
126 See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 81 (2010).
122

See Kendall

J.

PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 187,190,
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judge's own categorizations and connection, stating that if the judge
knows what a particular term means, then the court might look to a
dictionary to define the term. 127 In doing so, the courts ignore a vast
resource, the judges' own categories and connections, which could
offer enhanced claim constructions. In turn, richer claim constructions may alleviate the need for the doctrine of equivalents as a
hedge against the inability to express inventions in language.
B.

FUZZY SET MEMBERSHIP

After claim construction, infringement analysis proceeds by
comparing the accused device or process to the claims as construed.128 Literal infringement is found if the device or process falls
squarely within the territory delineated by the claims. 129 Another
justification for the doctrine of equivalents is to prevent unfairness
if a portion of the accused infringer's device or process falls slightly
on the outside of the claimed territory. 130 I contend that this too
clashes with how we think. Again we are forcing a definitional
framework in an area where it is more natural to think in fuzzy categories and sets. This too creates a system that requires the doctrine
of equivalents' flexibility.

127 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("In some cases,
the ordinary meaning of claim language ... may be readily apparent even to lay
judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application
of the widely ac~epted meaning of commonly understood words. In such circumstances, general purpose dictionaries may be helpful." (internal citations omitted)).
128 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en bane), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
129 See, e.g., Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA), Inc., 467 F.3d 1370,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
130 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997);
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,733 (2002).
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Literal infringement requires that "every limitation set forth in
a claim must be found in an accused product, exactly." 131 If any limitation is missing from the accused device or process, there is no
literal infringement. 132 To frame this slightly differently, to infringe
is to be a member of set claim. Membership in claim is binaryeither you infringe or you do not- and the criteria of membership
are also assessed in binary fashion. Some case law even evokes the
"necessary and sufficient" criteria of traditional, or definitional, set
theory, stating that "each and every claim limitation" must be
found in the accused device or process. 133
Prototype semantics explains that we do not deal with words
and concepts in a binary way. 134 Faced with a construed claim and
an accused device or process, the judge must execute precisely the
same mental task that we all perform upon encountering something
new- determining whether the new object fits within one or more
categories that exist, how well it fits within any given category, and
how it is connected to other items in that and other categories. But
the analysis for literal infringement does not pennit this: either the
accused device or process has element x, as construed, or it does
not. The judge is not permitted to conclude that the accused device
or process includes x', which is a really close match to x but is not x.
In order to infringe, or fall within claim, only objects including x are
considered.

131 Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Of
course, another requirement of infringement is that the alleged infringer must not
have the authorization of the patentee to practice the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
(2006) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, [imports,] offers to sell or sells
any patented invention ... during the term of the patent ... infringes the patent.").
132 See Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (citing TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
133 See, e.g., Abraxis Bioscience, 467 F.3d at 1378.
134 See supra Section II-A.
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Returning to the simplistic chair example, the definitional criteria for chair include a seat, 4 legs, a back, and the connection between the seat and the back, as well as the connection between the
seat and the legs. Literal infringement, like traditional set theory,
requires accused device to include each of these elements exactly.
An object that includes a seat, 4 legs, a back, and the given connections is a member of set chair and, for patent law purposes, a member of set claim and thus infringing. Consider now a chair that has a
seat, 3 legs, a back, and the given connections- basically a 3-legged
chair. If a houseguest were to ask for a chair, you would not hesitate
to give them the 3-legged chair. But, because the 3-legged chair
does not include each and every element of chair, and therefore
claim, it does not infringe. It is not possible to meet the criterion of
"4legs" pretty well-the criteria are binary. It is not possible to be a
very good member of claim-infringement too is binary. Given
how we naturally think, to determine a 3-legged chair is not a chair
seems wrong, particularly since the element "4 legs" may itself be
the less-than-perfect construction of the claim term, as discussed
above.
C. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED TO THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

Based on the above discussion, it would appear that the doctrine of equivalents is exactly what is needed to handle some of the
problems of language in patent law, both the crafting claims to cover the invention and the determination whether an accused device
or process falls within the delineated territory.
Language has not gotten any less complicated nor has claim
construction or infringement analysis improved. The justifications
for the doctrine of equivalents remain as apt today as they were at
the doctrine's creation. How then do we explain the evidence that
the doctrine of equivalents is on the wane? I contend that the doctrine of equivalents is appearing less frequently in patent infringement cases because courts are starting to handle patent cases in a
more natural manner, allowing fuzziness to be introduced during
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the claim construction or literal infringement determinations, rather
than as an afterthought that requires a special doctrine.
For an example of how this might work, consider again the category bird. If there was a claim covering bird, it might include the
following elements: an animal having a body with wings, feathers,
and a beak, as well as progeny that hatch from eggs and have the
ability to fly. 135 These criteria create the fence, inside of which infringement is found. A robin has a body with wings, feathers, and a
beak, hatched offspring, and can fly. And further, a robin meets
each of these criteria very well. The robin then infringes bird. More
often than the robin, however, the judge is presented with an accused device or process that is more akin to the penguin. The penguin meets the criteria of a body having wings and a beak very
well. It easily meets the criteria of having progeny that hatches from
eggs. But the judge is left with the penguin that has unusual feathers and cannot really fly. How does the judge analyze whether the
penguin infringes bird?
One thing a judge can do is interpret the term "feather" in a
fuzzy manner that includes more than just the type of downy feather typically thought of. The categories and connections in the
judge's mind permit him to recognize that the term "feather" is not
so limited. With this in mind, he can fairly consider that the penguin meets the criterion of a body having feathers.
Another thing he can do is apply the criterion of flight in a
fuzzy way. A robin, as the prototypical member of bird, exhibits a
very good ability to fly. Compared to the robin, the penguin's ability to fly is very poor. But say the penguin can propel itself with his
wings a bit. The bird may not be doing what we consider flying, but
he is showing some signs of flight. In definitional set theory, astra-

135 This claim is not realistic, but does provide an illustration of the issue. A real
life application of the theory is discussed below.
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ditional infringement analysis is considered, there is no gradient of
meeting the criteria-either it is or is not met. The penguin's level of
flight is too low to meet the threshold, and so the criterion is not
met. However fuzzy membership allows values in between met and
not met. If the penguin satisfies the other criteria well or very well,
and satisfies the flight criterion enough, then the penguin can still
be found to be a member of bird. The penguin is just not as good a
member.
When talking about patent infringement, this level of fluidity is
not acceptable, because it can be over-inclusive. For example, it is
possible that a platypus could be considered a very bad member of
bird, based on the fact is has a beak and lays eggs, even though it is
a mammal. To avoid an undue amount of "false positives," the
judge can assign varying weights to the elements. For example, he
may determine that it is very important for a bird to lay eggs and
have feathers and wings, less important for a bird to have a beak,
and not terribly important to be able to fly. Again, our prototypical
bird, the robin, meets all the criteria well. A penguin meets the
most important criteria, or at least fairly well depending on how the
judge defines the term feather. The penguin also satisfies the less
important criterion of having a beak. The penguin cannot fly, so he
satisfies that element to a lesser degree. But all in all, the penguin
meets a sufficient number of criteria to a reasonable degree of satisfaction, so the penguin is a member of bird. The platypus, however,
would not meet enough of the criteria; in particular, the platypus
does not meet two of the three key elements (having feathers and
wings). Finally, the ultimate determination of infringement may not
be binary. As long as the accused device or process, in this case the
penguin, meets a threshold level of a combination of the criteria, it
infringes. In the end, a penguin is still a bird.
Empirical or descriptive studies of patent opinions are unlikely
to observe this shift from strict set theory to fuzzy infringement
analysis because it is doubtful that a court would explain it was using intuitive prototype semantics instead of the doctrine. Why
would a judge mention that he read a claim and understood it the
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same way he read a newspaper and understood it? Because there is
no named doctrine to hang upon it, the act of defining and applying
claim language in a natural way would easily go unnoticed.
Of course, for the same reasons that it would be generally overlooked, it is difficult to point to clear evidence that demonstrates
that this is indeed the case. There are, however, some data that support these contentions. First, judges are likely to be using prototype
semantics in patent cases. In addition to the fact that it is a natural
human reaction to language and thinking, judges who are uncomfortable with the claim construction process may resort to what
seems effortless. Alternatively, judges who have had or fear having
their claim construction rulings overturned on appeal have no incentive to do any sort of interpretation that goes beyond their intuitive means. Second, in dealing with the same problems that lead to
the creation of the doctrine of equivalents in the United States, other
countries have chosen approaches that look much more like cognitive linguistics. Third, there are small indications beginning to appear in case law that suggest that prototype semantics may be at
work.
First, it is fair to assume that judges are using fuzzy categorization and prototype semantics. Judges, being human, would use the
same system of categories and connections to think about their encounters with the world. It is unlikely that they can turn off this
thinking when they are on the bench. And, even if they could, there
are at least two reasons why they may choose not to. On one hand,
some judges do not like patent cases and hope to get these cases off
their dockets as quickly as possible. 136 On the other hand, there are

136 See A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District
Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 682 (2004); Janice M. Mueller, Crafting Patents for
the Twenty-First Century: Maximize Patent Strength and Avoid Prosecution History Estoppel in a Post-Markman/Hilton Davis World, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 499,
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many judges who do make an effort to follow the Federal Circuit's
claim construction jurisprudence, but they are frequently overruled
on appeal, so much so that a number of these judges have spoken
up. 137 The natural reaction, in either case, would be to follow the
path of least resistance and perform claim construction and infringement determinations using ingrained prototype semantictype analysis.
Second, although United States patent law is not completely in
harmony with international patent laws, it is instructive to see how
others handle the same problem. One useful example, known as
"purposive construction," comes from the United Kingdom. 138
When construing the patent claims, the court is to ask whether a
person of skill in the art would understand that a particular term
required strict compliance, even should it not make much difference in the function. 139 This is consistent with fuzzy membership,

503 (1997); Edited & Excerpted Transcript of the Symposium on Ideas Into Action: Implementing Reform of the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1053, 1108-09 (2004).
137 See, e.g., Judge James F. Holderman with Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation
Predicament in the United States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 6 ("As a result of the
de novo standard of appellate review applied to our claim construction determinations, we United States district court judges feel like the late comedian Rodney Dangerfield because our opinions 'get no respect."'); Victoria Slind-Flor, The Markman
Prophecies, IP WORLDWIDE, Mar. 13, 2002, at 28, 30 (quoting Judge Samuel Kent as
saying that, on the issue of claim construction, the Federal Circuit is full of "little
green men who don't know Tuesday from Philadelphia" and that he does not get
excited when ending a patent case because "[the case] goes to the Federal Circuit
afterwards[, where] it's hard to deal with things that are ultimately resolved by
people
wearing
propeller
hats."),
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticlcFricndly.jsp?id=900005528997.
138 See, e.g., Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 183, 243
(H.L.).
139 !d.
A patent specification should be given a purposive construction rather
than a purely literal one derived from applying to it the kind of meticulous
verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to
indulge. The question in each case is: whether persons with practical
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because some elements of the claims may carry a higher weight,
and thus require strict compliance, while others do not. Using the
bird example, the element of progeny hatching from eggs may require strict compliance-if it does not lay an egg from which a baby
hatches, it is not a member of bird. This element cannot be deviated
from. But other elements, such as feathers and flying may carry less
weight and not require strict compliance.
Finally, court opinions are starting to indicate a movement toward prototype semantics and fuzzy infringement. For example,
consider the case International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp. 140 In this
case, the patent was for a semiconductor device having, among other elements, a "polygonal region." 141 One of the issues disputed at
trial was the meaning of that element. The district court, perhaps
reflecting fuzzy categorization, interpreted that the "polygonal re-

knowledge and experience of the kind of work in which the invention was
intended to be used, would understand that strict compliance with a particular descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was intended by
the patentee to be an essential requirement of the invention so that any variant would fall outside the monopoly claimed, even though it could have
no material effect upon the way the invention worked.
140 lnt'l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
141 See High Power Mosfet with Low On-Resistance and High Breakdown Voltage,
U.S. Patent No. 4,959,699 (filed June 22, 1989). Claim 1 of the '699 Patent recites, in
relevant part:
A high power metal oxide silicon field effect transistor device exhibiting
relatively low on-resistance and relatively high breakdown voltage; said
device comprising: a wafer of semiconductor material having first and
second opposing semiconductor surfaces; said wafer of semiconductor
material having a relatively lightly doped major body portion for receiving
junctions and being doped with impurities of one conductivity type; at
least first and second spaced base regions of the opposite conductivity
type to said one conductivity type ... first and second source regions of
said one conductivity type ...
at least said first base region being a cellular polygonal region; said cellular polygonal region being surrounded by said common conduction region; said first source region having the shape of an annular ring disposed
within said cellular polygonal first base region.
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gion" would "be generally but not perfectly polygonal- i.e., the
surface expression of the base will be a closed figure with generally
(not necessarily perfectly) straight sides." 142 The district court also
noted that the corners may be rounded, not precisely angular. 143
This looks a lot like a fuzzy category of polygonal, where there exists a bit of leeway around the traditionally defined mathematical
polygon. A perfect polygon with straight sides and angular corners
would be a very good, or even prototypical, polygon. A shape with
blurred sides and rounded corners would be a lesser polygon, but
may still fit squarely in the category of polygon. The Federal Circuit, however, took a traditional set theory stance, noting that a polygon must be defined as "a closed plane figure bounded by
straight lines." 144
The need for the doctrine of equivalents has not lessened, so it
makes sense that the problems that give rise to the doctrine are being addressed elsewhere in the patent infringement analysis. It also
makes sense that the movement is in the direction of natural behavior-how we normally think and understand language. As judges
resort less to the doctrine of equivalents and more to prototype semantics and fuzzy categorization, more instances of this type of
analysis are likely to become more visible.

D. ADAPTING PATENT LAW TO FIT Fuzzy INFRINGEMENT
If the use of the doctrine of equivalents is waning because
judges are beginning to use prototype semantics and fuzzy categorization to handle the problems the doctrine was created for, then
patent law too needs to adjust. In addition to abolishing the doctrine of equivalents as a doctrine, there are at least two other

See lnt'I Rectifier, 361 F.3d at 1370.
See id.
144 See id. at 1371-72.

14 2
143
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changes that would aid in making fuzzy infringement analysis
work: first, honor the categories and connections made by the district court by changing the standard of review for claim construction, and second, remove the prohibition on using working examples and accused devices for claim construction purposes.
The present standard of review for claim construction determinations is de novo. 145 Since its inception, various constituents have
argued that de novo review is inappropriate for a number of reasons.146 Regardless of the persuasiveness of other reasons to change
the standard of review, if claim construction is taking into account
the categories and categorizations existing in the district court
judge's mind, then these inputs have to be available for appellate
review. Fortunately, the winds of change seem to be blowing in the
Federal Circuit on this issue; even absent the argument that factual
review of a district court judge's categorizations and connections, it
is likely that claim construction determinations will soon be afforded a more deferential review. 147

145 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
bane).
146 One of the more vocal jurists calling for deferential review is Judge H. Robert
Mayer of the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J., dissenting) ("Now more than ever I am convinced of the
futility, indeed the absurdity, of this court's persistence in adhering to the falsehood
that claim construction is a matter of law devoid of any factual component.").
For examples from academic literature, see Thomas Chen, Note, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165 (2008); Jeffrey Peabody,
Under Construction: Towards a More Deferential Standard of Review in Claim Construction
Cases, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 505 (2008); M. Reed Staheli, Comment, Deseroed Deference:
Reconsidering the De Novo Standard of Review for Claim Construction, 3 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REv.181 (1999).
147 See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1041 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en bane) ("'
believe the time has come for us to re-examine Cybor's no deference rule."); id. at
1043 (Newman, J., dissenting from same); id. at 1044 (Rader, J., dissenting from
same); id. at 1045 Goint opinion of Gajarsa, Linn & Dyk, JJ., concurring in denial of
petition for rehearing en bane) (noting that a different case would provide a better
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Changing patent law rules to allow for, or even encourage, introduction of working models and the accused device or process
during claim construction does not have as much underlying support. However, even this proposal has been suggested to address
other problems and is therefore not an impossible impediment to
moving towards a system that acknowledges the prototype semantics and fuzzy categorization described herein. For example, there
have been calls requiring a patentee to have built a prototype in
order to obtain a patent. 148 I am not suggesting that a working
model would be required, simply that claim construction and infringement analysis would be better served by lifting the prohibition on considering information that would be helpful for the judge
to understand the invention.
There may be other changes to current patent infringement
analysis that would also allow the court to make use of intuitive
mental processes, such as fuzzy categories and connections. The key
is to embrace prototype semantics as a better method for determining patent infringement, rather than celebrate the death of the doctrine of equivalents.

vehicle to reconsider deferential review of claim constructions); id. at 1046 (Moore, J.,
dissenting from same).
148 See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, 77w Teaclzing Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 621, 642-43 (2010) (calling for a patent examiner to request a working model if
the patent application's written description may be inadequate); Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 392-93 (2010) (noting that requiring a
working model may increase commercialization but would be less than ideal); Cotropia supra note 123, at 120-22 (suggesting that the requirement of a working model
would discourage premature patent filing).
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CONCLUSION

A man who shouts "Your house is on fire" may not be able to define
exactly what he means by your and house and is and on and fire, but he
might still be saying something quite important.
-- J.B. Priestly

149

Much ink has been spilled announcing the death of the doctrine
of equivalents, more often in wishing good riddance to the doctrine
rather than eulogizing the long-lived practice. These articles are
focused on the wrong aspect, however. The doctrine was created for
very sensible reasons; the problems language causes for drafting
patent claims and determining infringement have not disappeared.
But in their rush to cheer the doctrine's demise, most scholars have
not looked at what has stepped into its place.
This Article suggests that the doctrine of equivalents is dead in
name only. Patent infringement cases are still plagued by the difficulty of using words to create fences around a patentee's exclusive
territory. And there is still the concern that an infringer may avoid
liability if his accused device or process is just barely outside the
defined fence. Rather than addressing these issues by performing a
formulaic infringement analysis and then using the artificial doctrine of equivalents to create flexibility, now these problems are being tackled at their root-the language itself. Cognitive linguistics,
and specifically prototype semantics, explains how we naturally
acquire, understand, and think about language. It is a simple step to
see how claim construction and infringement analysis are reflections of fuzzy categorization and non-binary membership sets.
Viewing infringement analysis through a fuzzy lens not only makes
sense, but also puts the judge in a position of doing what comes

149

E.g., Gardner, supra note 87, at 51.
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naturally. We regularly interact with our world in terms of categories and connections. It should not be surprising that the same analysis is occurring in patent infringement cases. The doctrine of equivalents will not truly die, because a penguin will still be a bird.
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